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Darshana Jayemanne
Time Invaders – Conceptualizing performance game time
The ultimate phase of a MMORPG such as World of Warcraft or the more recent hybrid RPG-FPS 
Destiny, where the most committed players tend to find themselves before long, is often referred to as 
the ‘endgame’. This is a point where the levelling system tops out and the narrative has concluded. 
The endgame is thus the result of considerable experience with the game and its systems, a very large 
ensemble of both successful and infelicitous performances. This final stage still involves considerable 
activity — challenging the most difficult enemies in search of the rarest loot, competing with other 
players and so on. It is a twilight state of both accomplishment and anticipation. As an ‘end’, it is very 
different from the threatening Game Over screen that is always just moments away in many arcade or 
action games. 
The differences between these two end states suggests that the notion of how games end, and 
the way this impacts on the experience of play, could be illuminating with regard to the problem of 
characterizing performances — because to end the game typically involves a summation or 
adjudication on the felicity of a particular and actualized performative multiplicity. Completing the 
game is, with regard to a given playthrough, the ultimate perludic act. 
A particularly important ramification of the cybernetic method presented in Chapter 8 is that 
the ‘magic circle’ becomes one digitalization among the (potentially) many that produce the structure 
of performance and the experience of play. It may be highly important and influential (as in the case 
of someone deeply involved in a game such that they lose track of the external world), or it may be 
relatively trivial (as in the case of someone distractedly playing a game on their phone while carrying 
on a conversation or some other activity). In either case, the magic circle can be conceptualized as a 
sense of totality — weak or strong — that is generated by the apparatuses of the game and the cultural 
expectations of players. The magic circle need not be posited as a primary ontological phenomenon 
that determines the playful status of what it ‘contains’, which leads to the asymptotic task of 
definitively pronouncing on the status of paradoxical phenomena that this book has highlighted 
through the aesthetics of infelicity. 
The concepts of the endgame and the magic circle both refer to a certain kind of high-level 
digital distinction that is the ludic equivalent of Austin’s ‘total speech act’ in the ‘total speech 
situation’ — two notions that he leaves undeveloped the end of his lecture series. This raises the 
question of how it might be possible to think about the sense of totality (whether weak or strong) and, 
more generally, how to situate performances within the overall performative multiplicity of a given 
game. Where analyzing primary and secondary digitalization can help define particular performances, 
the problem of how to situate such performances in relation to one another raises additional problems, 
particularly in light of gaming’s complex temporalities. 
This chapter will develop a method complementary to the cybernetic technique of Chapter 8. 
Called ‘chronotypology’, the method is derived from Agamben’s discussion of how playful signifiers 
change their temporal modality ‘after the game’. To continue the argument developed so far in Time 
Invaders, this has to be done without establishing the ‘whole’ as a de facto unit of performance. Once 
developed, the method will then be applied to a number of examples. The most important of these test 
cases will be narrative — one of the more enduring problems in videogame scholarship — leading to 
a close reading of the final ‘gallery scene’ in the videogame Life is Strange. Taken together, the 
cybernetic and chronotypological approaches form a comprehensive comparative method for 
analyzing videogame performances. 
 
Diachrony: Play and Temporality 
The videogame concept of the ‘endgame’ is similar to the formulation ‘end of the game’, which 
appears as a pivotal concept in one of Agamben’s most sustained discussions of play (1993a). Here he 
stages play in dialectical relation to the sacred, drawing on the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss (1966) 
and Émile Benveniste. According to Benveniste, there is an originary relation between play and the 
sacred. 
The potency of the sacred act resides precisely in the conjunction of the myth that articulates 
history and the ritual that reproduces it. If we make a comparison between this schema and 
that of play, the difference appears fundamental: in play only the ritual survives and all that is 
preserved is the form of the sacred drama, in which each element is re-enacted time and again. 
But what has been forgotten or abolished is the myth, the meaningfully worded fabulation that 
endows the acts with their sense and their purpose. (quoted in Agamben 1993, 69-70) 
Play thus is liable to preserve a set of formal rules (‘a topsy-turvy image of the sacred’). However, 
because it does not present a story or myth that connects with a meaningful history or tradition, it 
inscribes difference within repetition, resulting in a strong diachronic experience. For Agamben this is 
the import of ‘Playland’ in Collodi’s Pinocchio, where there is only the bedlam of an eternal holiday: 
play involves the ‘paralysis and destruction of the calendar’ (68). This can be compared with the 
sacred, which signifies synchrony or an articulation of continuity with the past through a 
‘consubstantial unity of myth and ritual’. Play tends to produce signifiers of diachrony (turning 
structures into events), while ritual tends to foster signifiers of synchrony (events into structures).1 
 In the Aranda culture of Central Australia, among the most synchronically-oriented cultures of 
his considerable acquaintance — for whom ‘even the relation between past and present… appeared in 
terms of synchrony’ (Lévi-Strauss 1966, 238) — Lévi-Strauss notes the presence of initiatory objects 
called churinga. These are ‘…stone or wooden objects, often engraved with symbolic signs, 
sometimes just pieces of wood or unworked pebbles. Whatever its appearance, each churinga 
represents the physical body of a definite ancestor and generation after generation, it is formally 
conferred on the living person believed to be this ancestor’s incarnation’ (238). By confirming the 
identity of living person and ancestor, the ritual creates a synchronic link between generations. 
According to Lévi-Strauss this process concludes with a strange reversal of the churinga’s 
own gesture within the ritualistic economy. If the churinga signifies the synchronic presence of the 
mythic past during the ritual (the ‘palpable proof that the ancestor and his descendent are a single 
flesh’), at the completion of this operation it reverses its valency, coming to signify a diachronic 
residue: ‘The role of the churinga would therefore be to offset the correlative impoverishment of the 
diachronic dimension. They are the past materially present and they provide the means of reconciling 
empirical individuation with mythical confusion’ (238). Even for the Aranda, who Lévi-Strauss reads 
as highly oriented to the production of synchronic signifiers,2 an object appears which furnishes 
‘tangible confirmation of the diachronic essence of diachrony at the very heart of synchrony’ (237). 
Agamben departs from the eminent structuralist’s account by arguing the churinga does not 
represent an ‘offsetting’ of the tendency of the ritual to minimize diachrony. Rather, the ritual 
apparatus reveals a fundamental volatility in signification writ large: ‘contrary to what Lévi-Strauss 
maintains, there is no contradiction between the fact that the Aranda declare the churinga to be the 
body of the ancestor and the fact that the ancestor does not lose his own body when, at the moment of 
conception, he leaves the churinga for his new incarnation; quite simply, a single object is here 
invested with two opposing signifying functions, according to whether the ritual is or is not yet 
terminated’ (Agamben 1993, 79). The churinga is thus an ‘unstable signifier’ capable of transforming 
its function upon reaching a certain limit: in this case, the end of the ritual. For Agamben what is at 
issue is not a logical contradiction between diachrony and synchrony, but a synchrono-diachronic 
system. 
Agamben, drawing on Benveniste’s arguments, compares the sacred churinga with the playful 
toy. In this way play and temporality are linked. The toy presents an analogous — but opposite — 
transformation when it leaves its own space: 
…the toy, as a representation of a pure temporal level, is undoubtedly a signifier of absolute 
diachrony, of the prior transformation of a structure into an event. But here too this signifier, 
once freed, becomes unstable, and is invested with a contrary meaning; here too, at the end of 
the game, the toy turns around into its opposite and is presented as the synchronic residue 
which the game can no longer eliminate. For if the transformation were really complete, it 
would leave no traces, and the miniature would have to correspond with its model, just as, at 
the ritual’s termination, the churinga would have to vanish, corresponding to the body of the 
individual in whom the ancestor has been reincarnated. (Agamben 1993, 79-80) 
The toy is like the churinga insofar as it too is an unstable signifier liable to transform its modality at 
the limit of a certain procedure. These two ‘embarrassing residues’ (80) attest as disturbing 
remainders to the contingency of their own operation, surviving as they do the very spatio-temporal 
topoi that they serve to open. 
The failure of both limit cases — the churinga and the toy, ritual and play — to complete 
their respective gestures shows that neither diachrony nor synchrony can ultimately eliminate the 
other pole: ‘the pure event (absolute diachrony) and the pure structure (absolute synchrony) do not 
exist’ (70). Instead, the continuity of the system requires the production of a differential margin 
between diachrony and synchrony. This is not to say that pure play or pure structure cannot be 
represented or evoked — the former has been depicted in the form of infernal punishments that 
involve permanent movement and interminable duration (Playland, Ixion’s wheel, Sisyphus’ stone) 
whereas the latter is imagined through imagery of perfect, unchanging and blissful heavens (Agamben 
1993). Similarly, because play and ritual both act on unstable signifiers, there are certain proximities, 
affinities and crossing-points between the two poles (such as funereal and initiatory games or the 
appearance of miniatures and toys in tombs). 
 
Chronotypology 
Agamben thus modifies Lévi-Strauss’ analysis by arguing that play is the diachronic correlate of 
ritual’s synchronic effects, and that these two processes form two particularly acute moments of a 
larger temporal system. However, in other work Lévi-Strauss himself does venture some explicit, if 
speculative, remarks regarding memory and technology that anticipate Agamben’s contentions. He 
compares the operations of ritual objects such as the churinga to documentary archives in Occidental 
cultures. Such seemingly very different institutions, he suggests, serve a similar temporalizing 
function insofar as their loss would deprive the past of a signifier critical to its ‘diachronic flavor’. 
This argument parallels Benjamin’s account of the decay of the aura (the aura as a ‘unique 
duration’ suffusing an original artwork). It also parallels Lévi-Strauss’ dissatisfaction with theories of 
totemism that ascribe to a variety of practices a primitive denotative function. In this critique, 
totemism serves as a necessary precursor that designates the basic elements necessary for and is itself 
part of more complex and systematic institutional forms. For Lévi-Strauss, ‘totemism’ as an isolated 
phenomenon does not exist (Lévi-Strauss 1971), but is an artefact of an anthropological mode of 
inquiry itself bound by the diachronizing assumptions of linear historiography. He critiques the 
theoretical reduction to a single primary operation excised from its place in a ‘a total system, which 
ethnologists in vain tried to pull to pieces in order to fashion them into distinct institutions’ (Lévi-
Strauss 1966, 218). Accordingly he objects to the contention of some nineteenth-century scholars that 
‘totemism was anterior to exogamy’ because ‘the former appeared to them simply denotative, whereas 
they divined the systematic nature of the latter’ (231). There is however nothing necessary about this: 
‘totemism may either present or preclude the characteristics of a system… it is a grammar fated to 
degenerate into a lexicon’ (232). 
As such ‘There is no need to invoke the exercise of vanished faculties or the employment of 
some supernumerary sensibility’ (221) to explain the prodigious classificatory schemes evident in 
cultures unacquainted with what we understand as scientific method. Such capacities are still in 
evidence in contemporary urban life ‘when we drive a car and assess the moment to pass or avoid a 
vehicle at a glance, by a slight turn of the wheels, a fluctuation in the normal speed of the engine or 
even the supposed intention of a look… the signs expressed carry with them their meaning’ (222-223). 
Thus for Lévi-Strauss what is at issue is not a primitive denotative set of practices (such as was 
assumed of totemism) that precede symbolic exchange and are subsequently lost in ‘hot’ or 
historically cumulative societies, but a cultural repertoire of procedures active across many levels. 
The example of the motorist who ‘does not distinguish the moment of observation from that 
of interpretation’ is similar to Benjamin’s notion of tactile habituation and Wilden’s discussion of 
primary digitalization — although Lévi-Strauss’ explanation for this capacity (a ‘reciprocity of 
perspectives’, signs ‘carrying’ their meaning) is more strictly semiotic in its framework. His 
assessment of archives can also be linked with computers insofar as they are mnemonic systems of 
data archivization, manipulation and retrieval, especially in light of his somewhat whimsical 
speculation that ‘…the day may come when all the available documentation on Australian tribes is 
transferred to punched cards and with the help of a computer their entire techno-economic, social and 
religious structures can be shown to be like a vast group of transformations’ (89). 
 
Unstable Signifiers and Temporality 
One wonders if the great anthropologist ever got around to playing Civilization: dubiously useful as a 
scholarly resource, but certainly a felicitous for those wishing to play with a ‘vast group of 
transformations’. In the bricoleur-like adoption of the terms ‘diachrony’ and ‘synchrony’, then, I am 
less interested in Lévi-Strauss’ structural explanations of social phenomena than the way that these 
concepts might be used to account non-reductively for the muddle of videogame performance. 
These speculations about ritual and toys can be recruited for the analysis of videogame 
temporality by connecting framing devices with Agamben’s ‘unstable signifiers’ — points of 
transformation between the production of synchrony and diachrony. Videogame performances act on 
these signifiers to change their temporal signification. Framing devices disseminate structures of 
performative judgement and thus facilitate performative transformations between synchronizing 
structure (ludological, tactile, narratological, semiotic, multiplayer, or any other that may be involved 
in a particular design) and the diachronic event and duration of play.3 A videogame is another 
apparatus for producing ‘differential margins’ between diachrony and synchrony. Where such margins 
once produced initiatory relations between entire generations or helped explain seasonal and cosmic 
phenomena, computers facilitate the production of increasingly compressed performative feedback 
loops and intensive fluxes of experience. 
Some precise comparative definitions are possible at this point. Diachrony is produced by 
apparatuses that separate, disperse or distinguish performative multiplicities, making them more 
distal. Synchrony is produced by apparatuses that bring together, converge or concenter performances, 
making them proximal. Analysis of a videogame performance (or indeed any other element) in these 
terms will be termed ‘chronotypology’.4 The key unstable signifiers in gaming are those framing 
devices that have ludic significance: that sort between felicitous and infelicitous play. However, all 
signifiers in a videogame have the potential to produce diachronic or synchronic experience. 
This approach adds temporal specificity to the performative theory developed in Chapter 8, 
which was oriented towards the analysis of how particular performances and framing devices arise (as 
illudic or perludic acts) by digitalization of the message-in-circuit or multiplicity of performances 
constituting a videogame. Chronotypology, by contrast, accounts for how performative multiplicities 
differ in comparative terms — how certain digital distinctions generate temporal experience. The 
approach allows the analytic location of illudic or perludic acts ‘within’ the game’s performative 
multiplicities. This is especially useful with regard to characterizing perludic acts. Because such 
performances enact a secondary digitalization, they are capable of language-like abstraction and 
semiotic versatility. A perludic act could be as simple as selecting a character at the beginning of a 
game, or as complex as completing a level, or indeed an entire game. All of these performances 
introduce a secondary digitalization into the game, but they are obviously performative multiples of 
very different ‘sizes’ or magnitudes, with very different ramifications for felicity judgements and 
styles of play. 
Chronotypological analysis is thus useful for orienting and characterizing perludic acts within 
the performative multiplicities of a particular game. For example, any non-reversible event or 
performance will exercise a strong diachronic influence over a particular playthrough, dividing it into 
two distinct segments. A very simple example would be the beginning of Metal Gear Solid 3: Snake 
Eater. Player character Naked Snake conducts a parachute drop and finds himself on a slightly 
elevated plateau above a forested area. All of his basic actions are available to him and players can run 
about on the plateau for as long as they please, but once he slides down from the plateau there is no 
way to return. The perludic act of exiting the plateau thus diachronizes two distinct performative 
ensembles. This can be distinguished from Firewatch, in which the player character can find 
themselves at a ‘Long Drop Down’. This digitalizes the space as players cannot directly return to the 
higher area. However, it does not diachronize the two areas as distinct performative multiplicities 
because the level design allows players to access the previous space in other ways. 
A more extended example of diachrony is the Virmire mission in Mass Effect. During this 
mission difficulties arise and players must choose between the lives of crewmembers Kaidan Alenko 
and Ashley Williams. This is a binary decision – there is no way to save both characters. The Virmire 
mission has ramifications for the Mass Effect sequels because storylines and characters are carried 
over between the games. Even players who start fresh in Mass Effect 3 are prompted to select one of 
these two characters to have survived the Virmire mission (Figure 9.1) during player character 
creation. 
 
<Figure 9.1approximately here> 
Alenko and Williams represent two distinct performative multiplicities — distinct sets of dialogue 
options, plot points, ludic tactical options and skills, and so on. They thus diachronize all 
performances of the game series into one of two types. 
 Chronotypology can also facilitate the close analysis of performances by particular players. 
Say two hypothetical subjects, Players A and B both achieve the perludic act of completing a 
particular game level. The level design includes a scripted cutscene which changes the rules of the 
game — perhaps the sun rises and visual conditions become more favorable. Neophyte Player A has 
trouble navigating the early part of the level, becoming lost and dying a few times before 
encountering the cutscene after forty minutes of play. She then completes the game level in twenty 
minutes more play. Player B, more experienced, fulfils the conditions that cue the scripted cutscene 
without any infelicitous performances in a relatively sprightly twenty minutes. However during the 
next section a certain lighting design element takes her fancy and she spends a lot of time admiring 
the scenery — she completes the level in forty minutes more play. 
These performances of the game level differ in innumerable ways depending on the scale at 
which they are analyzed. In spite of this it is possible to rigorously characterize the cutscene’s 
chronotype in terms of its diachronic and synchronic functions within the level design. This method 
means that the equivalent of a page reference in a book or a time code in film becomes possible in the 
study of videogames (with important ramifications for the study of narrative, a point expanded 
below). Player A’s sixty-minute performance of the level is diachronized by the cutscene into a forty-
minute and a twenty-minute performance; Player B’s is vice-versa. 
Conversely, the cutscene acts as a synchronic element that draws together both players’ 
performances — and indeed acts in the same way for all possible performances of the level. The 
performative multiplicities on either ‘side’ of the diachronic event of the cutscene — conceived as 
multiplicities — can conceptually be composed of any number of illudic or perludic acts, any of the 
vagaries of any particular player engaged in any particular session of play. Chronotypology can make 
subtle distinctions between A and B’s very different styles of play. This analysis could be carried out 
at any scale and according to any set of criteria according to which performative features are of 
research interest: A’s could be further diachronically segmented by the various times she died; B’s 
could be synchronized by her behaviors around new framing devices or design elements that 
happened to attract her attention after the cutscene. 
 
Farming Devices: Synchrony and Play In Videogames 
A question arises at this point: if, for Agamben and Benveniste, play is associated with the production 
of diachrony, shouldn’t we see only diachronically-oriented processes in videogames? Gaming’s 
fascination with forms and figures of motion certainly attests to an orientation towards playful 
diachrony as the fertile ground for the production of anachronistic signifiers; towards times long ago 
or yet to come, spectacular sporting events, other worlds and outer spaces, apparatuses ancient or 
medieval (such as in fantasy) and postmodern (such as science fiction). Marketing rhetorics of 
technological change and progress seek to maximize the production of diachrony in gaming culture. 
Benjamin’s treatment of the shock experience and cinematic montage can be seen as a 
particularly acute example of diachrony — the splitting apart or sudden digitalization of a mimetic 
field by a shattering event, a technique that reaches its apogee in action games for which felicitous 
play demands distracted habituation to rapidly changing fields of anterior motives. The action game 
seeks to flatten out temporality into a seemingly unalloyed ‘present’ which, as has been established, is 
in fact composed of a myriad of framing devices, forms of movement and montage effects generated 
by the apparatus. This seems to support Agamben’s association between play and the production of 
diachronic signifiers. If ‘even duration is subsumed to synchrony’ in the churinga, then in gaming 
even repetition is subsumed to diachrony. 
At least, that’s how the gaming situation has always been sold. Belying the narrative of 
technological progress are constant repetitions that de Peuter and Dyer-Witherford (2009) term 
‘studied unoriginality’ — the propensity of mainstream videogames towards sequels and remakes, as 
well as the use of serial aesthetics. Games have often remediated techniques that create powerful 
synchronic effects reminiscent of other media. Characterization, plot structures, thematics, the use of 
musical leitmotif and looping structures, cinematic sound staging and camera angles, popular voice 
actors, and many other game elements draw extensively on cinematic, literary and comic book tropes, 
techniques and formulae in order to create synchronizing effects of recognition. 
Further, while many games present diachronic images of the past or future, just as many bring 
apparatuses from various eras into synchronic proximity — juxtaposing magical, religious and 
technological forms. Benjamin and Adorno both noted ‘false resurrections of the aura’ and ‘dream 
kitsch’ in their analyses of capitalism (Stoichita 1996). The auratic figures of Final Fantasy and other 
RPG series provide many equivalent examples of ‘timeless’ elements amidst gaming’s characteristic 
diachronic din. As such, the association between diachrony and play does not seem conclusive in the 
case of videogames — or, if Agamben’s theory is strictly construed, ‘play’ is only one component of 
what people do with videogames. 
This qualified concept of play and diachrony is in fact is to be expected, as for Agamben the 
association between diachrony and play is subject to the observation that the pure event does not 
exist: there is, even in the most diachronic operations of play, always a synchronic remainder. A 
videogame, then, can be considered a diachrono-synchronic machine in its own right. This situates 
ludological and player-centric perspectives within a single temporal framework: a chronotypological 
approach can account for both the diachronic (a player-centric, embodied view of the muddle of 
gameplay) and synchronic (ludic, narrative and other structures) orientations of the many elements 
that constitute the complex weft and warp of a videogame’s temporal fabric. They are different points 
of view on the message-in-circuit that constitutes the game. 
Framing devices are particularly important in terms of generating synchronic effects that draw 
together the many performances players undertake during a given game. A key example would be the 
Half-Life 2 ‘visual dictionary’ explored in chapter 4, which acts as a way of communicating felicity-
structures to players through serial aesthetics. Synchronizations — particularly in the form of the 
figures of reversal and felicity-judgements that draw together a performance in a single ludic 
assessment at the end of the game — are as important as diachronic durations in constituting the 
muddle of videogame play. Synchrony thus plays a powerful role in gaming and is operative at 
various levels.5 In particular, it gives a temporal quality to perludic acts, naming a point at which a 
certain set of performances come together to achieve a certain ludic effect. It thereby represents an 
‘end’ to a given performance as the drawing together of certain elements, not as a totalizing ‘whole’. 
In addition to analyzing the temporality of performances and unstable signifiers, 
chronotypology can also be applied to signifiers as they appear more generally in gaming. Newman’s 
question about what constitutes the ‘Donkey Kongness’ of Donkey Kong games (2009), for example, 
can be conceptualized as a set of synchronizing elements (performative types, framing devices, music, 
character designs and so on) operative across the series. In spite of the great variations in the 
hardware, software, art, audio and other elements that appear across such a broad set of games, they 
retain a synchronizing influence, and this accounts for their “Donkey Kongness”. This arguably finds 
an apogee in Super Mario Maker, which places myriad elements at the disposal of players, all of 
which are elegantly synchronized by the core jump mechanic of the series. 
Synchronic effects can also be located in the curious repetitions and behavioral patterns that 
characterize videogaming as much as shocks, ebullient marketing and new graphical techniques. It is 
precisely because the temporal structures of gaming involve unique modulations of diachrony and 
synchrony that a distinctive cant can arise in order to discuss performances in specific games. Terms 
like ‘ticks’ (referring to the sound of a clock), ‘rounds’ (a certain time interval in which characters 
have a defined capacity to act), ‘dots’ (damage over time) and ‘dps’ (damage per second) all indicate 
the strange sectioning of time effected by performances and framing devices in games. 
The venerable institution of the save game is perhaps the most obvious example of 
synchronization. Saving a game essentially establishes a point at which the performances conducted 
thus far are synchronized — marking a game state from which further performances can be 
undertaken (each of which will be diachronic with respect to one another). While this function may 
seem a simple expedient to allow players to leave off games that are too long to be completed in one 
sitting, there can be important performative ramifications to save-game regimes. Games that include a 
quicksave and quickload function, or a checkpointing system that automatically saves the game when 
players reach certain areas encourage a rather casual attitude to the particular performance. Some 
games, such as Dark Souls and in particular Alien: Isolation, make progress much more precarious 
(Conway 2012) and thereby give more emphasis to particular performances. The save function is not 
simply an auxiliary compensation for real-world limitations on play time, but a synchronizing process 
that, in its specificity, can have a powerful effect on a given performance and the experience of play. 
Platform manufacturers also direct studios to legislate rewards for certain kinds of 
performance that are registered at a platform level — ‘achievement’ or ‘trophy’ systems which present 
criteria of performative felicity attached to a particular player’s online profile (Jakobsson 2009). Upon 
completing certain challenges or milestones, players receive an emblem which signifies their 
felicitous performance of that particular multiplicity. These rewards can encourage players to attempt 
new synchronizations of their performances that would not necessarily arise in the native game 
context — playing according to rules set by the platform’s reward system rather than the particular 
game. They also attempt to abstractly synchronize the performative multiplicity of a particular gaming 
career, evaluating the ‘quality’ of a player (albeit with a view to maintaining players’ investment in 
particular platforms). 
 
Playful Repetitions and Varieties of Synchrony 
Between the poles of diachrony and synchrony is a spectrum of complex temporal experience. Most 
any gamer knows the sensation of a Game Over which has returned them to a prior game state. After 
such a setback, play can seem a grinding imposition rather than an exhilarating anterior motive. The 
performative multiplicity has lost something of its diachronic capacity to generate novelty, the various 
sub-tasks and accomplishments imposing themselves all at once in a synchronic haze that can feel 
more like work than play. There is still, however, a diachronic element to winding back the 
infelicitous performance: an interminable duration that stands between the player and a new part of 
the game. It is important, then, not to simply dub a performance or signifier as diachonic or 
synchronic, but to think about the way that these temporal structures are intertwined in each case. 
‘Grinding’, ‘farming’ and ‘spamming’ are repetitive perludic acts that provide further 
examples of performances that operate in a highly synchronic register. These refer to a repetitive task 
that has little meaning in and of itself, aimed at some form of quantitative accumulation that will 
eventually lead to a qualitative shift. Grinding is to consistently execute a performance (such as 
continually making one type of item to practice a particular fabrication skill, or repeating one type of 
mission) that yields experience points or some other advancement criteria. Farming is the repeated 
exploitation of a resource, perhaps in the hope of gathering a certain threshold amount or to trigger an 
event that has a low probability of occurring (such as a ‘rare drop’ where defeating an opponent has a 
low chance of yielding a coveted item and is thus likely to require defeating that enemy many times in 
order to acquire the item in question). Spamming, related to the general term for junk email, is the 
constant repetition of a performance (such as using the same move over and over), perhaps because it 
is particularly efficient or perhaps because of panic or ignorance of more elegant play styles. 
 Although these activities may seem aberrant, mechanistic or otherwise against the ‘spirit’ of 
play, they are in fact codified by rule structures in many videogames. In order to access the most 
challenging areas and opponents of MMORPG games, there is often a structural requirement to attain 
higher character levels and abilities. The way to do this is by gathering items and equipment. As one 
Wired commentator opines, this involves ‘Hours upon hours of mind-numbing grinding. To “level up” 
your character, you’ve got to gain experience, and that generally involves doing a few simple tasks — 
mostly “killing stuff” and “collecting stuff” — over and over again’ (Thompson 2008, online). The 
MMORPG promise of extreme diachrony — the escape from everyday drudgery into a completely 
different temporality of high adventure and fantasy — is belied. In the performance of farming, the 
rush of combat against fantastical beasts becomes a repetitive harvesting operation, an almost empty 
synchronization of time that bulks out the play experience — fossicking for a deeply buried seam of 
diachrony in dense synchronic performative strata. 
 Such performances are not without pleasures or attractions, however. Academic Liz Lawley 
writes, ‘... unlike many of my “serious” gamer friends, I love the levelling grind of WoW... I spend far 
too much of my personal and professional life strategizing, dealing with intellectually and emotionally 
challenging situations. I don’t want to replicate that stress in a game environment... instead, I want to 
relax, to clear my mind, to do something repetitive that provides visible (to me, not to you) and lasting 
evidence of my efforts...’ (Lawley 2006, online). The desire to find ‘lasting evidence’ in repetitive acts 
is evidence of the dynamism of temporal experience in games, and reinforces the point that synchrony 
is not to be construed as stasis or lack of movement. Just as diachrony is an active creation of a 
distinction between performative multiplicities, so synchrony is not stasis but actively makes 
performances more proximal. The production of synchrony may involve a lot of work. 
Another structure particularly associated with MMORPGs in which such transformations are 
evident is the ‘instance’ — an area in the virtual world which possesses qualities of both uniqueness 
and repetition. In the shared world (itself divided up between various servers) are dungeons in which 
players can quest for experience, items and money. According to Blizzard’s official guide, 
An instance is a personal copy of the dungeon for you and your party. 
The only players in this instance will be yourself and members of your party — no one else 
can enter your dungeon instance. Instances allow you and a group of friends to have a more 
personal experience exploring, adventuring, or completing quests in your own private 
dungeon. (Blizzard Entertainment 2015) 
Entering an instance thus inscribes another moment of temporal transformation within the 
performative multiplicity of the game. While the group is entering the same ‘space’ (at least in terms 
of level and encounter design), the instance diachronizes the group’s performance, hedging it off from 
the rest of the server and game world. Players may run through an instance many times, typically in 
order to coax a low-frequency drop from certain enemies. 
Structurally, the instance is a time loop: the tasks to be performed have both been 
accomplished many times before and desperately require the attentions of intrepid adventurers. The 
instance itself, as well as its inhabitants, exist in a strange quasi-persistent state: they are neither alive 
nor dead, but ‘killable’. One such character is the Lovecraft-inspired monster that is the final enemy 
of the ‘Polaris’ dungeon in The Secret World. This character is faced whenever players enter the 
Polaris dungeon, after a certain period of time has elapsed after their last attempt. 
 
<Figure 9.2 approximately here> 
When a particularly important instance is introduced (a ‘raid’ dungeon), the most involved and 
organized guilds will compete to beat it as a world first, often posting video online to prove their 
claim. This moment of diachrony is similar to the setting of a new record in a sporting context. It will 
help establish certain effective patterns, approaches and tactics for subsequent groups, enabling them 
to better synchronize their performances towards a felicitous performance of the raid. 
These examples show the complexity of the exchanges between synchrony and diachrony in 
extremely common game structures, as well as the way that performativity mediates the 
transformation of unstable signifiers. In the most demanding performances such as speedruns, 
felicitous play is contingent on reducing alternate (that is, diachronic) procedures and durations as 
much as possible into a single, flawless temporal sculpture. Just as this optimal synchronization is 
achieved, however, the performance flips its signification and becomes unique: separate from all other 
performances of the game, a diachronic marker that acts as a challenge to others. 
 
The Game Over 
The ultimate perludic act and synchronic effect in a videogame is the ‘end of the game’. This end is 
operative as a kind of ludic ‘horizon of expectation’ (Jauss & Benzinger 1970): a set of anticipations 
about what signs are unstable and will, over the performance of the game, change their mode of 
signification. This characterizes what is often referred to as ‘winning’ or ‘beating’ the game as a 
perludic act. By exploring this element of synchrony it is possible to respond to and advance Austin’s 
speculations at the end of How To Do Things With Words regarding the ‘total speech act’, and thereby 
conceptualize a ‘Total Ludic Act’: the Game Over. 
The critical point to draw from Agamben’s discussion is that there can be no complete 
synchronic intuition of the game’s performative multiplicity; the pure structure, as such, does not 
exist: at any one time, the process of play involves a particular (and hence, diachronic) performance.  
As with absolute diachrony or synchrony, while the Game Over cannot be directly experienced, it can 
be represented. As they make their way through a game, players form a kind of mental model of the 
total set of performances that the game will involve. 
At the beginning of the game, the Game Over is experienced as a relatively pure diachrony: 
the game’s signs represent the duration of the immediate play experience and the promise of more 
play. The temporal margin here takes the form of anticipation about the game’s intention span, 
storyline, characterization, serial aesthetics and any other systems that may be present. From this fresh 
point of view, the Game Over appears as a pure ‘yet-to-be-played’.6 As play progresses and players 
habituate themselves to the title’s particular peformative multiplicity, expectations arise as to which 
signs are volatile framing devices and are thus liable, at the end of the game, to change their 
signification from highly diachronic (‘yet-to-be-played’) to a diachronic-synchronic balance (‘can-be-
played-with’) or to highly synchronic (‘always-will-be-played’). These can be identified with 
ludological elements, which signify the diachronic-synchronic balance of ‘can-be-played-with’ and 
narratological elements, which begin in a diachronic ‘yet-to-be-played’ and come to signify an 
‘always-will-be-played’. 
Chronotypology thus provides a powerful vocabulary for thinking about a nonlinear or 
ergodic text such as a videogame as a ‘whole’, but this whole is conceptualized as the Game Over as a 
process of synchronization. This expresses the phrase, used in Chapter 4’s critique of Galloway’s 
notion of allegory, of games as an ‘allegory in a state of collapse’ with temporal precision. In this way 
it is possible to conceptualize the whole of a game while still honoring the requirement to avoid 
theoretically nominating that whole as a kind of unit in its own right. The Game Over is particularly 
significant for game criticism as it allows thinking all the heterogeneous components — whether 
diachronic and player-centric or synchronic and formalist — within one conceptual framework. 
From a chronotypological point of view, the Game Over is in fact operative at various 
intensities at every moment of a videogame. Although in Chapter 8 it was argued that it would be 
unwise to theoretically prescribe certain perludic acts (as opposed to utilizing the theory in the 
analysis of particular game performances), with regards to the Game Over there are three ‘levels’ of 
synchronization that may be useful to postulate as rough benchmarks. Some of these terms are drawn 
directly from existing game-related discourse. They help to show the versatility of chronotypology as 
a comparative approach to videogame performances capable of accounting for how experience is 
structured in videogames. 
 
Fail State 
The first level is the Game Over in its classic arcade sense, where the end of the game appears as a 
proximal performative concern — the possibility of a performance that pushes a critical metric or 
resource beyond an allowable digital threshold and thus ends the game infelicitously. This Fail State 
(which could of course be one of many) causes the game to end and reset to some allowable state, as 
well as synchronizing a particular performance (perhaps in the numerical judgement of a score). This 
type of Game Over, sometimes quite remote at the start of play (due to a tutorial level or other safe 
area in which players can become habituated without the threat of failure) can intensify as play 
progresses, critical resources are depleted, and certain performances become closed off. The iconic 
example would be the gnomic instructions of Pong: “Avoid missing ball for high score”. 
This situation is taken to an extreme in hardcore genres and games such as God Hand or 
Demon’s Souls, in which terminal infelicity is an incessant pressure. In Danmaku — literally ‘bullet 
curtain’ (Bailey 2013, online) — games such as Ikaruga (Treasure, 2001), a hail of deadly ordinance 
emerges in established (synchronizing) patterns across the screen. The performances necessary for 
survival are extremely tightly interlinked and circumscribed. Margins for error are slim to nonexistent, 
overtaxing players’ intention spans. The argot physique of gaming is maximized: intuition and 
interaction asymptote towards a single flux. As in the speedrun, the temporality of performance is 
hammered out into almost pure spatialities — ‘pulsating, multi-hued latticeworks and arabesques’ 
(Bailey 2013, online) — that demand distracted habituation of a very high order. As the curtain of 
bullets move across the screen, players must not only guide their avatar with exacting precision 
through an urgent multitude of framing devices, but do so with the knowledge that certain paths may 
allow momentary felicity but lead to an inexorable dead end. 
 Players may also formulate their own Fail State conditions for a particular performance: cases 
in which infelicity is not terminal according to the rules of the game, but would cause the player to re-
start the game or re-load a previous setting. Such specific and exacting performances are often 
recorded or streamed for an audience. In games in which score multipliers are based on continuous 
combos or linked performances, and as such optimal performance is demanded from the outset in 
order to be competitive, an early mistake may cause players to abandon a performance. A 
‘permadeath’ run (Abraham 2009; Keogh 2015), for example, is one in which any death will cause the 
performance to be abandoned. 
 
Endgame/The Game Teleonomy 
The ‘Endgame’, which could also be referred to via the more technical term ‘Game Teleonomy’, 
designates the sense of a videogame in a holistic sense as a text or cultural artefact. Rather than a 
constant entropic potential or threat of the Game Over, this longer-term ‘end’ has more to do with a 
felt coherence or synchronic quality to a gaming text’s overall performative multiplicity. This may 
very well be a sense of overall narrative coherence (a point that will be expanded below), but many 
performances may have primarily ludic ramifications for the Game Teleonomy: choosing a race in 
TES V: Skyrim has a far-reaching synchronic effect on all subsequent performances. 
A performance of a videogame through to the Endgame can be termed a ‘full playthrough’. 
This is the experience of the Game Over as ‘Total Ludic Act’, a sense of emergent cohesiveness and 
context that acts as a synchronizing anterior motive. The term ‘teleonomy’ (which Wilden (1968) 
explicitly deploys in favor of ‘teleology’) is important here as it emphasizes that the experience of 
overall cohesion to a game is variable and multifinal rather than necessarily linear — even though in 
many games there are identifiable linear or highly synchronic structures such as narratives and level 
progressions. Completing the game felicitously performs a transformation in which many of the 
game’s framing devices shift from signifying diachrony (the yet-to-be-played) to signifying synchrony 
(the Game Over). 
As emphasized above, even though the Endgame is a synchronic expectation or horizon, it is 
in fact operative at every moment of play, helping to define the diachronic duration of the experience. 
This teleonomic sense is, for example, evoked by players who seek to sanction certain types of play or 
specific performances — complaining about spawn camping in FPS games, continuous early rushes in 
RTS games, the choosing of characters who are judged overpowered in fighting games, and so on. 
The argument that certain performances are against the spirit of the game in question relies on a 
certain notion of its teleology: how the performative multiplicity feels. These performances are 
perfectly indifferent to the apparatus, but they violate players’ sense of what the game is and should be 
as a felicitous whole. 
This formulation of the Endgame can address both narrative-centered games such as Final 
Fantasy VII and ‘sandbox’ style games such as Grand Theft Auto V or Minecraft. The former titles 
feature non-reversible performances in terms of the advancement of a plot, whereas in the latter 
games (though they may have a central plot that can be completed this may be largely ignored or held 
in abeyance indefinitely) their Game Teleology is, primarily, the euporetic imperative to explore a vast 
ensemble of performances. These games effectively offer a capacious enough set of performances to 
give players the latitude to establish and pursue a large number of goals as perludic acts (driving a taxi 
in Grand Theft Auto, buying a house in TES V: Skyrim) that are constituted by the game’s repertoire of 
performances. In such cases, narrative synchronies are subordinated. They can often be ignored or 
delayed indefinitely. Conversely, such game worlds can often give the impression of being highly 
synchronic: frozen in time until the player character comes along to sort out whatever problems the 
local NPCs have managed to get themselves into. 
Imagery invoking the Game Teleology is common in wider gaming culture and in marketing. 
In the classic arcade cabinets, these images take the form of a literal off-frame space. The cabinet is 
traditionally illuminated with an image that influences what it feels like to play with the game’s 
performative multiplicity: even if the graphics of early arcade games were very simple, they still 
supplemented their abstract forms of movement with this lurid pulp images. The cabinet’s imagery is, 
therefore, not simply an arbitrary fictional layer imposed on the abstract forms of gameplay, but a 
synchronizing imaginary: an affective visualization of the Game Teleonomy. 
The synchronic potentials of imagery to encourage extrapolation and speculation are very 
important in game marketing. Demos and other promotional materials are often oriented to providing 
a similar sense of what the finished game will feel like. Typically, game demo performances at trade 
shows or distributed to players will be tightly circumscribed and utilize special builds in order to 
evoke a game that does not yet exist (Klepek 2015). As a result, the demo performance will only go to 
certain areas and undertake certain tasks — but these performances may not appear in the final game 
at all. The demo thus faces the difficult task of using a highly synchronized performance to create the 
diachronic feeling of a far more expansive world to explore and set of performances to enact. 
These attempts to envisage the experience of play before the game is shipped can lead to 
thorny issues. If players eventually discover that the specifics of the Game Teleology intimated by the 
demo or other advertising material does not conform to the finished game (as was the case with games 
such as Destiny, Bioshock: Infinite and Aliens: Colonial Marines) they may feel that they were 
misled. From a consumer point of view a demo advertises a certain experience which was not 
vindicated by the finalized product, whereas from a developer and publisher point of view it may be 
necessary to cut game elements regardless of what the marketing department has been up to. An 
infamous example of this was the Killzone 2 trailer shown at E3 2005. The trailer’s graphics gave the 
impression that they were running in real-time on the then-upcoming PS3 console, although it was 
subsequently revealed that the demo was in fact pre-rendered by the studio based on what they 
thought the machine could do. Similarly, No Man’s Sky (Hello Games 2016) was marketed to create a 
headily euopretic sense of diachronic potential through a procedurally generated galaxy. However, the 
game’s performative multiplicity gave rise to synchrony because there was only a small set of things 
to do in this immense space. The backlash in each case was intense, and serves as an index for both 
the importance and the perils of representing the Game Teleonomy in such a heterogeneous medium. 
Trade publications and advertising images also try to envisage the Game Over when they 
cover games that are still in development through representative imagery. However, these are not 
simple captures of in-engine visuals but are edited to adjust lighting, smooth edges, add characters and 
so on. While touching up images is regular practice in advertising, games often sell themselves on the 
capacity of their engines to generate remarkable graphical experiences. Such images have colloquially 
come to be known as ‘bullshots’ (Plunkett 2012) because they give an erroneous impression of what 
the game will actually look and feel like in the diachronizing muddle of play. Similar issues arise in 
crowdfunding, where campaign backers are effectively helping to finance a game product on the basis 
of a certain expectation that creators construct of its overall Game Teleology. 
These examples are all evidence that players begin forming a synchronizing notion of the 
Game Teleology even before a game is released. The most remarkable example of this was P.T. 
(Kojima Productions, 2014). Short for ‘playable trailer’, this was ostensibly a demo for the AAA 
game Silent Hills, but it was released in a grainy state that made it seem as if it was produced by a 
nonexistent indie called ‘7780s Studio’. The demo attracted considerable interest and once the puzzles 
were solved, the game’s production quality improved considerably and credits revealed that Kojima, 
film director Guillermo del Toro and actor Norman Reedus were attached. The final twist was that 
Konami and Kojima subsequently parted ways, meaning that Silent Hills would never be developed. 
P.T. thus has the opposite temporal signification of the typical game demo, bullshot or trailer. Where 
the typical demo is a synchronic structure that can never really live up to the diachronic experiences 
of the game it foreshadows, P.T. actually offered genuinely diachronic possibilities for play — only to 
be forever frozen in time as the signifier of a possibility that will never come to pass. 
 
The Gaming Situation 
This expanded set of influences on the play experience leads to the third level at which the Game 
Over can be said to be operative. It is more strictly an ‘after the game’: the activity and cultures of 
videogaming itself, taken as a field of cultural production (Bourdieu 2003). This, in an efficient phrase 
coined by Eskelinen (2000), can be referred to as the Gaming Situation. 
A proper analysis of this level is clearly the province of sociological and ethnographic 
methods, which are beyond the scope of this book’s discussion of performativity. However, there are 
some aspects of the videogame-specific ‘after the game’ that can briefly be discussed here. 
Retrogaming culture, for example, seeks to create a temporal margin that evokes and nurtures a 
nostalgic Gaming Situation. The figure of the ‘gamer’, the development of which Kirkpatrick (2015) 
has reconstructed through gaming magazines, exerts a very high-level and potent synchronizing effect 
over the mainstream industry as a presumptive ‘target market’ that motivates both publisher 
investment and design aesthetics. Games (often those made by independent designers or studios) that 
depart from this set of conventions or refuse to present the usual anterior motives are liable to be 
labelled as ‘non-games’, ‘walking sims’ or other derogatory labels. 
The concepts of intertextuality and serial aesthetics explored in previous chapters are some 
examples of how the Gaming Situation and gamer culture can often exercise a synchronizing effect on 
the experience of playing individual games. Many forms of the wider gamer culture, including official 
trade publications and magazines as well as cultural texts such as chiptunes music, Let’s Play videos, 
streaming practices and webcomics, thrive on the web of pop-culture literacy and intertextuality that 
characterizes much of popular fan culture (Ndalianis 2004). Particularly influential performances and 
framing devices can enter the wider Gaming Situation, becoming important reference points for 
gaming as a culture and attitude. Aeris’ death in Final Fantasy VII, the tram-car bound introductions 
to Half-Life games, and the controller-port switching encounter with Psycho Mantis in Metal Gear 
Solid are all examples that have become indelible parts of the collective lexicon of gaming culture.  
 
Videogame Narrative: A Test Case for Chronotypology 
As a test case for chronotypology (and in particular, the concept of the Game Teleonomy) I will turn 
to the problem of narrative. This has been a contentious issue in the study of games (Murray 2005; 
Apperley & Jayemanne 2012), insofar as narratives are often seen as linear while games can have 
multiple outcomes. It is certainly true that many games do not possess a readily identifiable narrative 
(ie. Tetris), or that the stories are somewhat pro-forma pretexts to the more important action gameplay. 
However, there are numerous games for which narrative is clearly identifiable, generating what 
Costikyan (2013) identifies as ‘narrative uncertainty’. This is a very similar sense of anticipation 
concerning narrative events and sequences to that of a linear novel or film. 
The rise of video sharing and networked publics has made it very easy to show the 
importance of narrative and narrative uncertainty to many players: ‘all-cutscenes movies’ that edit 
together all the key cinematic sequences of particular games often have millions of views on 
YouTube. This indicates that videogames can generate significant narrative and spectatorial uses and 
gratifications. Popular channels such as “The Game Theorists” are devoted to exploring the ‘spatial’ 
(Jenkins 2004) and ‘indexical’ (Fernández-Vara 2011) storytelling that shape the environments of 
games such as Dark Souls, Destiny and Five Nights at Freddy’s. Narrative is an extremely important 
element in many videogames — and, as the creation of many different narrative forms in game fan 
culture shows, even non-narrative games tend to be comprised of highly ‘narrativizable’ elements. 
Chronotypology can aid in the analysis of videogame narrative because it provides a 
comparative method capable of moving past the binary of linear and non-linear form. From this point 
of view, narrative — barring modifications, glitches or other departures from the ‘orthodox’ game text 
— can be rigorously defined as an apparatus that synchronizes all full performances of a game. All 
performances of the Mass Effect series will task players with choosing the death of a crewmember. All 
performances of Planescape: Torment will begin with The Nameless One waking in the Sigil 
Mortuary. All performances of Alien: Isolation will involve Ripley making her way to the 
supercomputer at the center of Sevastopol space station. These narrative devices act as synchronizing 
‘anchors’ across any performance of a given game. It is this temporal function that has the most 
similarities to the development of fragmented narrative form in film, television, and postmodern 
literature, albeit it is deployed in a different way. 
Countable diachronic elements (such as multiple endings) are common in games and can be 
designated as variable narratives. Games such as 80 Days introduce different characters and plot 
possibilities depending on which routes players take through the game. Some narrative-centred games 
explicitly signify when a variable choice has been made. The Walking Dead (Telltale Games 2012) 
will alert players if their actions have a certain affect on the attitude of a particular NPC, thereby 
identifying a forking point in the narrative. Both Until Dawn (Supermassive Games 2015) and Life is 
Strange make use of the butterfly motif to signal points at which a diachronic effect has split the 
narrative. Life is Strange offers a limited time-travel ability, enabling players to redo recent events and 
see how they might play out in light of different conversational threads or actions — essentially, 
making the save game mechanic part of the diegetic game world itself. The way that these diachronic 
choices play out in the longer term is still something that needs to be discovered through extended and 
repeated play: re-approaching the point of diachronic divergence in order to make a different choice. 
Although narrative synchronizes all complete performances of a videogame, as noted above 
this is to be understood as a process that is only maximized at the Game Over. Story elements are 
highly diachronic from the point of view of an initial playthrough: players want to know how the 
game’s story unfolds. The death of the playable character Aeris at the hands of antagonist Sephiroth in 
Final Fantasy VII, told through a cutscene, is such an event. Generally, playable characters in JRPGs 
are knocked unconscious rather than killed in combat.7 To have a character in whom ludic effort and 
time was invested (levelling up, collecting equipment and so on) removed from play by narrative fiat 
proved shocking both on narrative and ludic levels. An unspoken agreement between designers and 
players seems to be broken. 
Aeris’ murder seems to have left something of a lasting legacy even in the mercurial culture 
of gaming. As one player wrote: 
Once the shock of witnessing Aeris’ sudden and unexpected death subsided, I immediately 
assumed she would return in one way or another. After all, this was fantasy, right? Sticking to 
the rules of fantasy, the dead maiden is always revived by the daring hero and we, the 
audience, will walk away with a smug smile on our faces. (Ambigore 1998, online). 
The event is described by this player in terms of extreme diachrony — as a shock that violates an 
expected formal closure based in determinate generic tropes. The sense of betrayal is framed in 
explicitly temporal terms, set off against a determinate notion of the Endgame: ‘Alas, Aeris does not 
come back and this important promise is meaningless, not to mention a total waste of time’ (ibid, 
online). 
This sense of an ‘important promise’ indicates the power of the narrative form within the 
game. Rumors circulated that it was possible, if the right actions were performed and conditions met, 
to resurrect Aeris. In fact the character’s death, combined with the game’s enigmatic closing sequence, 
turned Final Fantasy VII as a whole into something of an unstable signifier. An ‘incomplete game 
theory’8 arose holding that the game had shipped before the developers could implement Aeris’ 
revivification due to time pressures from producers and marketers. However, according to this theory, 
these time pressures also meant that the game launched before the game makers could remove all 
narrative and ludic evidence that it had originally been planned. 
A related notion arose in fan discussions that the game’s commercial release had been 
bowdlerized. For these players, certain unstable signifiers and performances took on extremely 
powerful significance. This complexity is evident in the narrative form through which they sought to 
place these elements within the complex regimes of diachrony and synchrony at work in Final 
Fantasy VII: 
When you get Aeris’s fourth limit break she has most likely already died. If you actually do 
what you need to do to get it before she dies you waste vast amounts of time (it took me three 
extra hours of getting her limit breaks up). The point is that if you get it before she dies, it 
doesn’t seem like you should have it yet. (RTSmith005, quoted in Cheshire 2004, online) 
Such highly involved negotiation of tenses and persons is common in commentary on videogames, 
arising from the difficulties involved in characterizing a performative multiplicity. The assertion of 
performances feeling like ‘a waste of time’ in light of Aeris’ death is notable insofar as this sense of 
superfluity comes into relief against structures (narrative in the first case, ludic in the second) that 
might be projected to obtain at the end of the game: that is, the point at which diachronic unstable 
signifiers sustaining the events and duration of the particular playthrough will have changed their 
valence to signify synchrony. This is expressed with regard to both narrative and ludic elements. 
 The dismay shown in RTSmith005’s response to Aeris’ death indicates how the various 
apparatuses involved in a game dynamically build up expectations during the course of play: the sense 
players develop of Final Fantasy VII’s ‘off-frame space’ is one with strongly narrative characteristics. 
The incomplete game theory is evidence that narrative can have a high-level synchronic effect on the 
reception of a videogame. Furthermore, expectations about the development of narrative can spur 
speculation about ludic systems. 
 The game’s protagonist (and for the majority of the game, the avatar), Cloud Strife, can be 
usefully contrasted with Aeris in terms of how his plotline responds to the chronotypological demands 
of the game. Cloud is one of gaming’s numerous ‘amnesiac protagonists’: viewpoint characters who 
awaken in a strange world. This trope (which also appears as a key plot point in Planescape: Torment) 
has something of the reputation of a tired cliché in gaming, but the purpose it serves is to place the 
protagonist in a position of ignorance and wonder that resonates with players’ diachronic sense of 
possibility: in this way, the character’s aporia is mapped onto players’ euporia, and diachronizing 
setting, narrative and characterological elements can be introduced with equal justification across the 
avatar-player message-in-circuit. Both have the effect of giving a rationale for an exploratory attitude 
towards the game world. Cloud’s complex chronotypology indicates the way that avatars in general 
serve as nodes for the balancing of diachronic and synchronic signification: they must bind 
performances together through characterological and narrative means, while also providing diachronic 
possibilities envisaged by the game design. This has led to the creation of strange character types, 
such as the ‘silent protagonist’ and the ‘customizable avatar’, that are endemic to gaming. 
Although Final Fantasy VII is a venerable title, more recent phenomena also show that 
players still actively construct a sense of the Game Over through narrative form. The obscure 
narrative to Dark Souls’ history was pieced together by fans in forums and online videos. The ending 
to Mass Effect 3 caused a storm of online controversy. The main complaint was that the intricate 
decisions and outcomes that occurred across the three games in the series were not represented in the 
closing cinematic. Instead, the same simple fireside vignette was seen by all players. That is, the 
diachronic aspects of performances of the Mass Effect series — the specific details of which made 
each unique — were subordinated to a single anodyne cutscene. This ending was subsequently 
expanded in response to this player protest. Similarly, the online reception of the episodic Life is 
Strange involved players seeking to intuit and predict the game’s future narrative and ludic structure: 
to extrapolate what the extant signifiers of the game would look like at the synchronizing moment of a 
Game Over. 
Narrative, then, is one apparatus through which games engender diachronic and synchronic 
experiences from a performative multiplicity. This takes many intertextual forms. Many fighting 
games, such as the Street Fighter series, feature multiple narratives. Typically each character has a 
storyline that progresses as the player wins matches. A felicitous playthrough ends with the player’s 
character winning the World Warrior Tournament. Therefore there are several endings to the game 
which are obviously mutually exclusive to some degree or another. ‘Canonical’ victors of each 
tournament are often only established with the release of a new game in the series, at which time all 
the other alternate endings become somewhat counterfactual. This results in a motley sort of 
storytelling, in which the caricatural design elements of the characters are often played up in 
picaresque, comical and outré scenarios: the hirsute and nomadic Blanka, for example, finds himself 
deposited in a zoo at his ending for Capcom vs. SNK 2: Mark of the Milennium 2001 (Capcom, 2001). 
In the Guilty Gear series, where the participation of some characters in the game’s tournaments 
concern existential questions and world-shattering events, for her part trainee chef Jam Kurodaberi 
wants to win enough money to establish her own restaurant. 
 These sorts of exuberantly variable narratives, which revel in the inconsistency of branching 
plots and unevenness of tone stand in contrast to more conservative licensed properties that aim for 
fictional and stylistic consistency. Newman reports that the Halo novelizations are officially endorsed 
by the game’s corporate owners, granting them the same source of legitimation as the games 
themselves. They take place in the game’s off-frame space: ‘the novelizations precede, move on from 
and connect the portions of the narrative presented in the games’ (2009, 50). In this form of 
remediation, the Game Over is represented as being coterminous with a highly integrated group of 
media products. Surman (2007) argues that in the comparatively ramshackle Street Fighter 
constellation it is the highly distinctive special moves of the various characters that, across a 
heterogeneous set of contexts, are remediated over and above any particular narrative forms. In the 
live-action Street Fighter: The Movie (1994): 
Importantly, the performance of special moves in the movie is central to the appeal of the film 
to fans of the videogame. These signature poses are reserved for the closing scenes of the 
movie, and function as ‘deciders’ in these final staged action sequences. Ryu’s ‘hadou-ken’ 
fireball, Ken’s ‘shoryuken’ dragon punch, Guile’s ‘flash kick’, Blanka’s ‘electric attack’, 
Vega’s ‘rolling slash’ and Bison’s irrepressible ‘psycho crusher’ all make noteworthy 
appearances, to assure that the iconicity of the videogame is rehearsed with due thoroughness. 
(Surman 2007) 
Where the Halo franchise re-deploys narrative events from the games into action-oriented novels and 
comics, remediations of Street Fighter both celebrate and lampoon the salient features and spectacle 
of the characters’ super moves. The former emphasizes the synchronization of a single narrative line; 
the latter facilitates multiple synchronic affects. 
 
Narrating Gameplay 
Techniques and practices that synchronize videogame performances are not confined to storylines. 
Players often narrate their performances, and this takes the form of several genres such as the FAQ, 
the walkthrough and the Let’s Play. E-sports events such as professional Starcraft or League of 
Legends tournaments (Taylor 2012) often require the contribution of commentary teams (referred to 
as ‘casters’, while those who govern what is seen by audiences are ‘observers’) whose role is to help 
audiences understand the various performances they witness. Much like commentary in televised 
sports and athletics, e-sports commentators contextualize, clarify and critique the ongoing process of 
play — constructing a narrative that both characterizes past performances, contextualizes play as it 
occurs, and anticipates future possibilities. The casters’ discourse thus acts to synchronize the elite 
performances of the players, conveying structures of performative judgement and evaluating felicity. 
Where a particular opening by one professional player may seem to an inexperienced audience 
member as a confusing muddle of separate performances or acts, the commentator identifies the 
synchronic element as a build order (Chapter 6) and can thereby speculate on the diachronic 
possibilities that this opens up as play proceeds. Winn (2015) has argued that the design of MOBA 
games such as League of Legends is oriented from the ground up to be streamed and presented before 
large audiences: the narrative constructed by commentators to synchronize the performance of the 
elite players is also key to the success of the genre as a spectacular e-sport for mass consumption. 
 Another genre of videogame-generated narrative is the ‘Let’s Play’ or ‘LP’, which developed 
on message boards but has expanded in style and format to currently include some of the most wildly 
popular videos on YouTube. In a Let’s Play video, players will record a performance of the game for 
distribution and commentary by others, possibly through an online forum of some kind (LPs are often 
organized through forum threads). The host player may request input from others at certain points 
(naming characters, assigning stats, rehearsing in-jokes and so on), thereby synchronizing the group’s 
contributions into a single performative style. LPs made by more popular and established players will 
generally be edited to eliminate infelicitous segments in which they are stuck or unable to proceed: 
celebrity YouTubers abhor an aporia. On the other hand, ‘Long Plays’ eschew slick editing and instead 
record an entire performance including grinding, farming and failures. 
The LP could involve screenshots and bridging text, or a video recording of the performance 
with or without a commentary track. In this way an individual or community narratively synchronize 
their performance of a game. A notable example of this genre is a LP of a set of connected 
performances of Slaves to Armok: God of Blood Chapter II: Dwarf Fortress (Adams 2006-ongoing) 
called ‘boatmurdered’. Each player completed a year of game-time and then passed the save file to 
another while constructing a narrative detailing the events that occurred during their performance (a 
‘succession style’ LP). The LP synchronizes the performances of the multiple players and the fate of 
their shared city. 
Game-related narratives can thus arise at various stages of play and reception. They can be 
produced by various groups who may have differing levels of cultural, legal and commercial 
legitimacy (Newman 2008). These value and status judgments flow on to their narrative productions 
(as ‘canon’ and apocrypha), but common to them all is their synchronizing approach to videogame 
performance. 
 
‘Sins Against Videogame Time’: The Chronotypology of Life is Strange 
The final example of chronotypological analysis is a gallery scene that will complete the arc threaded 
through The Cabinet of Cornelis van der Geest, The Unknown Masterpiece, The Crying of Lot 49 and 
Oryx & Crake. This scene appears in the episodic Life is Strange, a videogame which explores 
temporality through figures of reversal. Like other key game texts explored in this book, LiS 
articulates an auto-critique of gaming through an aesthetics of infelicity. This will also serve as an 
example of the capacity of chronotypology to think ludic and narrative elements together within the 
one framework. 
The gallery scene in this case sees protagonist Max Caulfield tearing in half a selfie that she has 
taken with her analog instant camera. This figure of reversal frames her in front of a wall in her dorm 
room that she has covered with her own photographs — an intimate metapictorial gallery that she 
calls her ‘cocoon’. Her analog photography links her to specific spatial and temporal contexts: a 
polaroid’s photochemical processes cannot be manipulated with the same facility as digital images. 
The analog quality to her photography is reflected in the game’s art style, which almost has a painterly 
quality. It’s as if we see everything through Max’s ‘eye’: “If I’m not looking through a viewfinder, I’m 
looking through a window. Always looking.” 
 That eye is talented: Max is a student at a prestigious art school called Blackwell Academy in 
the fictional town of Arcadia Bay, Oregon. Her gallery selfie was to be her submission to the 
prestigious ‘Everyday Heroes’ competition, the reward for which is exhibition in San Francisco’s 
Zeitgeist Gallery. Her charismatic and accomplished teacher Mark Jefferson, who is fond of 
Hitchcock’s maxim that film is ‘little pieces of time’, has been urging her to enter a photograph. 
However, Max has confidence issues and is reluctant to enter her selfie for judgment. After a 
terrifying dream in which she witnesses a tornado destroying Arcadia Bay, a shaken Max heads to the 
bathroom where she finds and takes a photo of a striking blue butterfly. She then witnesses an 
altercation between a blue-haired girl and an unstable student which ends with the girl being shot. 
It is at this moment of shock that she discovers that she has the power to rewind time, appearing 
back in Jefferson’s class. Forewarned, she is able to save the life of the girl in the bathroom, who she 
later recognizes as her childhood friend Chloe. The pair begin to explore Max’s powers (as she tells 
herself, “It’s time to be an everyday hero”), and the Twin Peaks-esque mysteries of the seemingly 
quiet town. Their investigations are propelled by the case of a missing student called Rachel Amber 
and a viral video of another student, Kate Marsh, who had been drugged against her will. 
 Max quickly finds that her rewind ability allows her to approach social and other situations 
with newfound confidence reminiscent of Hugo’s description of Enjolras: ‘he had already, in some 
previous existence, been through the revolutionary apocalypse’. If a situation goes awry, Max can 
simply rewind and try again. This capability only extends into the relatively recent past, however: if 
overused, Max starts to feel ill and blots reminiscent of photochemical overexposure blur the screen. 
The sleuthing she undertakes with this ability comes naturally — as many characters note, she is a 
very nosy person (Chloe’s mother Joyce jokingly calls her ‘Nancy Drew’). As is quite typical of 
adventure games, players can have her wander about blithely reading people’s email and other private 
documents. The flipside is that she is capable of gaining a more complete view of the context for 
people’s actions and behaviors, a tendency that her power accentuates. 
The time span she is capable of rewinding appears in the game interface as a spiral. While the 
spiral is analog (reversed animations play out as Max rewinds), it is marked with dots which represent 
digital and diachronic potentials. Essentially, each spiral represents a ‘a little piece of time’ — a 
temporal eddy. The spiral designates a perludic act that Max can resynchronize again and again, 
‘developing’ the performative multiplicity in what is truly her own time. Max’s power and the 
centrality of her gallery selfie write the figure of reversal and the framing device into the textual fabric 
of LiS, thus making it a fitting close to the gallery-scene series explored in Time Invaders. 
Later in the game, Max discovers another temporal ability: the capacity to travel back even 
further in time through focusing on polaroid photographs. Where her rewind spiral is limited to the 
immediate past, her ability to enter an instant photograph is bounded in space: she cannot leave the 
photographed scene. It is also prone to the common time-travel trope of unintended consequences: she 
cannot predict how her adjustments of the past scene will diachronize the present when she returns 
through the polaroid. She isn’t even sure if the timelines she is traversing rearrange one world, or if 
each represents a completely separate reality. 
Players are warned that certain performances have a diachronic effect that is beyond the scope 
of Max’s immediate rewind ability by the appearance of a butterfly motif and the message ‘This 
action will have consequences…’. Essentially, the butterfly icon indicates that a certain performance 
is an unstable signifier. Where the basic rewind is more like a snapshot with relatively simple 
outcomes (whether a conversation goes well, for example), the butterfly motif represents more 
sustained causal threads. The signifier in question was liable to remain unstable for quite some time 
for players who, if they were playing as each episode was released across 2015, would have to await 
future instalments. As in PS:T and Dark Souls, the save-game mechanic is incorporated into the 
diegetic world and the ludological structure of the game, informing Max’s experience of her world 
and dramatizing her difficulties negotiating between observation and action. 
Like Balzac’s painters, Max and Chloe are inscribed with distinctive temporal significance9 and 
conflicting attitudes to memory and futurity: the former’s surname references Salinger, and the 
latter’s, the goddess Demeter. Max’s return to Arcadia Bay leaves her feeling guilty for having left 
Chloe, whose father William died in a car accident during her absence. Chloe has not moved on from 
this event as attested both by herself and by her mother Joyce: “Chloe chose to remain in the past.” 
These temporal motifs influence their characterization: Max is reserved, and Chloe urges her to make 
the most of both her artistic and temporal abilities. For her part, Chloe is overconfident to the point of 
being extremely prone to finding herself in lethal situations. The two friends are linked by a blue 
butterfly that evokes both the stasis of the cocoon and the potentialities of metamorphosis and 
Lorenz’s ‘butterfly effect’. 
Tropes and imagery invoking temporal loops and figures of reversal recur as Max explores her 
old childhood town, including birds flocking in synchronized patterns; vortices; images and locales of 
the past; a junkyard hideout; time-travel sci-fi; theories of relativity; teen drama and small-town 
Americana clichés; concerns about surveillance. However, as Max uses her powers over the course of 
the episodes, increasingly diachronic and non-reversible phenomena start to appear: dead birds, 
beached whales, meteorological and climactic aberrations such as unseasonal snowfalls, untimely 
eclipses, double moons. These are all capped by the prophetic vision of the tornado: climate change 
appears as the paradigmatic diachronic signifier. The episode titles also develop from synchronic to 
diachronic signifiers: from Episode 1 (‘Chrysalis’) to the proliferating possibility of Episode 3 
(‘Chaos Theory’) and finally the binary of Episode 5 (‘Polarized’). 
The game’s most affecting signifiers of diachrony are the viral video of a drugged Kate Marsh, 
and the memento mori of a vanished Rachel Amber. Unlike Max’s reversible vignettes, the pious 
Kate’s exposure to a digital networked public is non-reversible. The strictly religious Kate, tormented 
by the video’s distribution and her inability to remember the night in question, is driven to the roof of 
the school. Max can help her, but at a time when she has overtaxed her rewind power: the scene has a 
strong diachronic quality because players must navigate the outcomes of this conversation without the 
game mechanic which they had come to take for granted. Later in the game, Max and Chloe discover 
Rachel’s decomposing body: preventing her death is outside the scope of Max’s temporal powers, 




The increasing tendency to diachrony becomes the basis of Life is Strange’s aesthetics of infelicity: 
the more that Max tries to definitively resolve the temporal complex she has created, the more loose 
ends and unintended consequences crop up. Infelicity also obtains at the level of plot, as Max’s 
attempts to uncover who was responsible for what happened to Kate and Rachel lead to a false 
conclusion, allowing the true culprit — Mark Jefferson — to kidnap her, killing Chloe in the process. 
Jefferson turns out to be something of a Humbert Humbert crossed with a comic book villain: 
he is obsessed with photographing what he perceives as the moment of transition between innocence 
and experience. Max escapes her imprisonment by going back in time through the selfie she took in 
the game’s opening scene, looping back to Jefferson’s class with full knowledge of his misdeeds. She 
ensures that Jefferson is apprehended, preventing him from ever killing Chloe. She also gains the 
courage to enter her gallery scene selfie into the Everyday Heroes contest and wins a flight to San 
Francisco and a career as a feted photographer. Her ‘selfie cocoon’ has become the gallery scene of a 
true artist. 
Through this gallery scene everything, it seems, is wrapped up in a nicely felicitous Game 
Over. However, the game keeps going. Hints of infelicity begin to mount. Max once again struggles 
with her social anxiety when mixing at the gallery. Another indication that something is wrong is the 
farcical nature of the gallery scene, which sours the triumphant exhibition by pastiching the art 
world’s denizens as vainglorious and trivial — not really worth networking with in the first place. 
Finally, Max receives a call from Chloe, who says that the storm has indeed come to destroy Arcadia 
Bay before being abruptly cut off. 
 Max chooses to travel back in time through her Everyday Heroes photo in order to destroy it 
at the moment it was taken. Enacting this figure of reversal, she wagers, will ensure that she never 
wins the competition and remains in Arcadia Bay to help save her friends and family: the loss of a 
career seems trivial by comparison. However, where previously her trips into the polaroid past have 
been to scenes bounded by a dreamy white light, now there is the angry blurs, streaks and mottles of 
badly developed photographs. “What am I doing to time?” she wonders as she tears apart the selfie. 
The resulting timeline is overtly infelicitous at both narrative and ludic levels. Max is forced to 
re-navigate many scenarios she has performed felicitously (or at least, survived) in previous episodes. 
Reality itself seems to break down: surreal level designs present twisted rehearsals of past events and 
distorted versions of other characters. Finally, Max finds herself before the very storm with which the 
game opened, save that this Chloe is there as well. Chloe argues what they have long suspected, that 
the temporal anomalies and ultimately the storm arise from the initial rewinding of time to save her 
life. Max then faces a choice: sacrifice Chloe to save Arcadia Bay, or sacrifice the town to save Chloe. 
Many players received this stark binary ending with sentiments similar to those of the Mass 
Effect 3 ending controversy: a game which had tasked players with deciding the outcomes of so many 
plotlines and relationships failed, in the end, to play them out in a nuanced and spectacular game-
ending cinematic. Here too, the ending was often judged as insufficiently diachronic. The game 
proper is a genuine performative multiplicity, but it ends in a mere forking path. 
Another common player reaction is reminiscent of arguments that time spent improving Aeris’ 
abilities in Final Fantasy VII is a ‘waste’ from the point of view of the Game Over. LiS wraps back to 
a ‘before-the-game’: the moment of Max’s first rewind, a time before time became so crumpled. The 
polarized choice between Chloe or Arcadia Bay frames all the other choices and temporal complexes 
in the game, but is not meaningfully diachronized by any of them: ‘At its conclusion, Life is Strange 
leaves players with one of two possible outcomes, and in either case absolutely nothing from earlier in 
the season matters anymore’ (Sanskrit 2015). These frustrations once more show the complex 
interplay between ludic and narrative elements, reaffirming the ways in which players actively 
construct a sense of the Game Teleology in the muddle of play. These dynamics are particularly 
evident with regards to LiS, as players produced forum posts and videos outlining their theories of 
what would occur in forthcoming installments. 
These conceptions of the ending of LiS as an excess or as wasteful can be analyzed in 
chronotypological terms. As noted, the game builds its aesthetics of infelicity across each episode as 
the core game mechanic — seemingly so oriented to synchrony — leads to narrative, thematic and 
ludic consequences that have increasingly aggravated diachronic qualities. However, it is not as if the 
felicitous ending does not exist, so much as that it is subordinated to the true Game Over. As noted 
above, Max seems to have resolved her time-hopping problems by travelling back through her gallery 
selfie, breaking out of her ‘cocoon’ with the ability to solve the town’s problems. Because she can act 
with the foreknowledge granted by her power’s figures of reversal, characters comment on how self-
confident and capable she has become: a veritable Everyday Hero. 
The abrupt re-introduction of the tornado plot amidst what seems to be the denouement of a 
felicitous Game Over gives the subsequent gameplay a supplemental character: it seems like an ‘after-
the-game’. This is reflected in a surreal breakdown of established game design codes and pretenses to 
realism. Ludic structures become unmoored and lose their synchronizing reliability. This aesthetics of 
infelicity coincides with a caustic dose of auto-critique: the dream-sequence is the most ‘videogamey’ 
part of LiS. Interspersed among the interpersonal themes, character-centric dialogue and measured 
pacing that form the main materials of the game are scenarios that seem included mainly in order to 
incorporate stock videogame mechanics: a fetch quest involving searching for bottles in a junkyard, 
stealth gameplay avoiding security guards in the academy pool, and door digicode puzzles.10 Max 
expresses her exasperation as she encounters belated — almost apologetic — versions of these 
mechanics in her nightmare: ‘Oh no, bottles... this might be hell’; ‘I’ll be so grateful if this is the last 
digicode’ and in an unused audio file ‘I’m going to make the designers pay for all these bullshit code 
puzzles’.11 
Near the end of her nightmare, Max emerges into a scene set in the town’s familiar diner, in 
which doppelgängers of most of the characters that she has met throughout the game are assembled. 
 
<Figure 9.x approximately here> 
The assembled characters comment critically on players’ decisions, upbraid Max for misusing her 
powers, mock her pretensions to heroism, or lambast her for missing opportunities to help them. 
Finally, she finds a version of herself sitting in a booth: ‘I’m you, dumbass. Or I’m one of many 
Maxes you’ve left behind… Thought you could control everybody and everything, huh? Twist time 
around your fingers? You only wanted to be popular. And once you got these amazing powers, your 
big plan was to trick people into thinking you give a rat’s ass... You’ve left a trail of death and 
suffering behind you.’ 
 LiS’ gallery scene thus leads to a final episode that is overwhelmingly characterized by the 
aesthetics of infelicity. The neat synchronizing loops that players expect from conventional 
videogames are supplemented by the irreducible diachrony of the game’s final choice, and no amount 
of rearranging the past will afford a felicitous ending. Read in this way, LiS is an auto-critique and 
refusal of the aesthetics of felicity that are so dominant in mainstream game design and indeed in 
technoculture more broadly. The dismissive attitude to the typical structures mandated by game design 
(fetch quests and so on) combines with the title of the gallery scene — Everyday Heroes — in order to 
highlight how impoverished the temporal schemas of gaming are when they bear the ludic weight of 
achievability. 
Although branching paths and satisfying endings are diachronic at the level of individual 
games, at the larger level of the gaming situation they are imparted with a retroactive equivalence 
through what Keogh (2015) terms gaming’s ‘hacker technicity’: the logics of a consumer culture in 
which potentiality is routinely subordinated to the expectation of its eventual actualization. The Game 
Over must deliver in shock or in spectacle; above all, it must not feel like wasted time. However these 
design imperatives mean that videogames’ diachronic potentials are provisional and to some degree 
equivalent, imparting a synchrony across the cultural field that LiS refuses with its indelibly 
diachronic ‘after-the-game’. 
Simultaneously, in the refusal encoded in its aesthetics of infelicity, LiS highlights the 
difficulty that mainstream videogames have in exploring the everyday: their temporal structure. The 
form’s obsession with anterior motives, with conflict and warfare, with far futures or distant pasts — 
with heroism that is anything but everyday — means that euporetic moments of stillness and 
reflection (as noted in Chapter 5, these are featured in LiS) and everyday heroes are comparatively 
rare in a field of production that insists on new innervations. Games which evoke other modes of 
experience are liable to be derided as ‘walking sims’ and ‘non-games’. LiS makes the most typical 
game mechanical sections seem supplementary and excessive and in this way acts as a provocation 
not only to the exploration of wider thematics in videogames (adolescence in a networked society, 
same-sex attraction, abuse of authority and so on) but also to a more sophisticated attitude to the 
diachronic and synchronic potentials — the chronotypologies — of performance. 
At the same time, the game’s supplementary diachrony reflects an everyday characterized by 
multiple apparatuses and processes of innervation — from mass surveillance to anthropogenic climate 
change — that produce the complex couplings and decouplings of temporality that Boris Groys 
(2011) terms ‘projects’. Chloe, as memento mori and strange performative attractor, insists on the 
reality of the ragged, threadbare time that has comprised the game, precisely because it has no bearing 
on the final scene: ‘Wherever I end up after this… in whatever reality, all those moments between us 
were real, and they’ll always be ours’. Max’s infelicities (she just really isn’t much good with her 
either her detective work or her ‘power’) belies the rhetoric of the avatar as a simple channel for 
player choice or empowerment. This final gallery scene leads not to virtuoso control but the aesthetics 
of infelicity: sins, to paraphrase Pynchon, against videogame time. 
 
1 As Agamben insists, is important to note that in Lévi-Strauss’ usage, diachrony and synchrony do not imply 
dynamism and stasis respectively: rather they pertain to processes of temporal separation and convergence. 
Combined, these constitute a ‘synchrono-diachronic system’ (Lévi-Strauss, 236). These processes may be as 
‘dynamic’ or ‘static’ in producing signifiers of synchrony as they are in diachrony. 
2 The institution of the churinga ‘diminishes until it disappears altogether as one progresses northwards’ (237) 
towards societies such as the Arbanna and Warramunga. 
3 As has been stressed throughout, this does not imply simply the ‘instantiation’ of a rule set in a particular play 
situation but as Chun puts it, new ways of going astray. 
4 This term is indebted to Bakhtin’s literary-critical category ‘chronotope’ (1982). 
5 ‘Synchronous play’ and ‘asynchronous play’, for example, are common terms in game design to refer to 
whether players act at the same time or in a staggered turn-based fashion. 
6 Even here, however, diachrony is not absolute: players’ experience with previous games in the genre or the 
particular hardware setup create synchronies at other levels. 
7 This is not one entirely unprecedented in the genre of JRPGs but nonetheless fairly rare. The character Galuf 
dies as a storyline event in Final Fantasy V, for example, but even here his abilities as developed by the player 
are passed on to his granddaughter, who becomes a playable character — the time spent making Galuf more 
powerful is not lost. A commercially produced device that allowed manipulation of the game code (a 
                                                            
                                                                                                                                                                                        
‘Gameshark’ for the Playstation) can ‘resurrect’ Aeris so that she can participate in battles, but in terms of the 
storyline sequences she remains dead. 
8 An example can be found in a FF VII plot FAQ by falsehead (Cheshire 2004). 
9 Agamben (1996) argues that the striking co-incidence of playful and funerary phenomena in many cultures is 
due to both being unstable signifiers: initiates take the place of departed ancestors through ritual. LiS draws 
these themes together through the perennial American preoccupation with teenage years, and Chloe’s own 
penchant for getting herself killed. Also important is the search for the dead Rachel Amber, who is represented 
by a ghostly doe, and the name Arcadia Bay, which evokes memento mori canvases entitled Et in Arcadia ego 
by Barbieri and Poussin. 
10 LiS also caricatures another of gaming’s too-easy design tropes in the firearm: use of guns in the game is 
never powerful or successful, and Chloe even manages to kill herself with a ricochet in one particularly 
infelicitous scene. 
11 Unused audio files for Life is Strange can be found at http://life-is-strange.wikia.com/wiki/Unused_Audios 
